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The paper below is a conference draft written in 1997 that I have never 
reworked into a publishable paper for a variety of reasons. Chief among 
these is that in 2000, in his monograph, The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-
huang, Martin Kern articulated ideas very similar to some of those in this 
essay, basing his points on Kanaya Osamu’s 金谷治 1960 book, Shin-Kan 
shisōshi kenkyū 秦漢思想史研究  (Research on the history of thought 
during the Qin-Han era). Kern cited my draft in his comments, noting 
respects in which it added to Kanaya’s points, but it was clear to me that a 
number of key ideas I had presented as original were basically only a 
rediscovery of what Kanaya had found much earlier in work that was far 
better grounded. I’d had the good luck many years before of being able to 
study with Kanaya – a terrific scholar and a wonderful person – and my main 
response to Kern’s discussion was dismay that I had failed to read Kanaya’s 
work on these issues and that my ignorance of it was so manifest in my 
paper. 
 I am posting the draft now, as it was first written (with a note added 
when I made the draft available for broader circulation at the request of 
Bruce Brooks in 1999), because it lays out evidence relevant to the dating of 
the Daxue (Great Learning) and Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) that 
supplements observations I’ve made in recent online translations of those 
texts. Although the scholarship here is incomplete and presented informally, 
it may provide helpful context for readers interested in pursuing issues about 
text dating that I raised in my general introduction to those translations. 
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The spirit of this paper is revisionist, but not particularly innovative. I believe the early China 
field has for some time been engaged in rethinking the received story of the Qin Dynasty, which 
I intend to question again here. Derk Bodde’s clear and capable overview of the Qin in the 
Cambridge History, for example, foregrounds Qin achievements in state building, questions the 
significance of the celebrated book burning, and dismisses the tale of buried scholars.1 More 
recently, Jens Petersen has argued that the Qin index proscribed a range of books significantly 
different from those traditionally conceived.2 In the discussion that follows, I will join the 
skeptics by suggesting that the relationship between the Qin and members of Confucian teaching 
lineages was not, as traditionally portrayed, one of bitter conflict, even after the book burning. 
On the contrary, my thesis will be that members of the Confucian school collaborated closely 
with the Qin.  
I will suggest that this collaboration had several specific results. First, it contributed 
towards the production of a corpus of texts that I will label “encyclopaedic”; second, it ultimately 
contributed to the early Han’s anti-Confucian attitude; third, it shifted the major paradigm of 
Confucian activity away from the transmission of ritualistic and ethical mastery through master-
disciple cult relationships to the transmission and mastery of texts; fourth, it led later generations 
                                                 
1Bodde 1986. 
2Petersen 1995. Petersen mentions more profound skepticism about the very historicity of the book burning on the 





of Confucians to rewrite history to deemphasize Confucian collaborationism during the Qin. 
In addition to climbing on something of a bandwagon, the discussion that follows also 
bears the unattractive features of being very speculative and of drawing on evidence that is, for 
the most part, well known. If it has a contribution to make, it is that it may add some new angles 
to the current re-perception of the Zhou-Qin-Han transition that may provide fruitful lines for 
future research. 
 
The crisis of the late third century B.C. 
To begin this discussion, I would like to review some characteristics of late third-century China 
that would have inclined all members of the literate elite to cooperate with rather than resist the 
Qin state. 
From the fall of Wei in 230 until Qin’s final conquest of Qi in 221, there was nearly a 
decade for people in post-Zhou China to come to terms with the arrival of a new era. As the 
inexorability of the Qin conquest became increasingly evident, Confucians, along with all others, 
would have had ample opportunity to adjust to the idea that the society that had generated the 
traditions of their times was coming to a close, and that the unified empire awaited for centuries 
was arriving at last. Whatever negative feelings about the Qin Confucians and others may have 
possessed, these would most certainly have been tempered by the fact that Qin clearly would 
have been increasingly pictured as the shape of the future.  
We tend to look at the Qin as an extraordinary decade, lasting from the conquest in 221 to 
the death of the First Emperor in 210, a stretch of time comparable for Americans, perhaps, to 
the New Deal. But in 221, Qin hegemony had already been a growing fact of life for a decade, 




like that of other dynasties, endure for centuries. Any notion that Confucians, or anyone else, 
would have felt it reasonable to wait for the Qin to “blow over” would seem to be an 
anachronistic projection of later perceptions of the Qin. People who had adopted an attitude of 
withdrawal or non-cooperation with the debased political culture of the late Warring States era 
while waiting for Tian to make up its mind about the future would have been sorely tested by the 
evident outcome of Tian’s deliberations. Without any precedent of short-lived dynasties, 
continued non-cooperation would have represented self-isolation from Tian-guided history. 
Apart from Bo Yi and Shu Qi, few men had ever possessed such confidence in their own virtue 
as to feel content following the moral imperatives of their hearts over the clear commands of 
Heaven. 
Moreover, the arrival of the Qin would have created a severe financial crisis for 
Confucians and other Dao-masters. Since Wei Wenhou’s edict of 446 established the precedent 
of court sponsorship of wise men, Confucians and other members of the zhuzi had come to rely 
upon the patronage of power holders at various levels for their financial security. The apex of 
this had come in the establishment of Jixia in Qi during the late fourth century, but after the 
collapse of the academy in 265, patronage of philosophical types appears to have been 
maintained by major courtiers and warlords such as Huang Xie in Chu and Lü Buwei in Qin.3 
As the Qin conquest of the warring states proceeded eastward, these sources of patronage began 
to disappear along with the patrician clans that the Qin destroyed or removed west. 
Finally, it would be helpful to ask, why we would suppose that Confucians or people in 
general, other than power-holders in non-Qin territories, would have felt any strong resistance to 
                                                 
3I have discussed the economics of philosophical patronage in a paper that is to be published in a festschrift volume 
(sooner or later, I’m told). A substantial portion of what I say in this paper either summarizes arguments central to 




the Qin, apart from any proto-“nationalistic” sentiments that might be natural in lands that had 
for so long been accustomed to define themselves in terms of regional identities. Naturally, the 
process of military conquest creates grievances and regrets for what may have been lost, but the 
Qin were hardly conquering exemplary ruling houses that had won the loyalties of the people or 
of Confucians. The Qin has traditionally been portrayed as brutal in its Legalistic administration 
and anti-Confucian, but there is plenty of evidence to bring this into question. While gradual de-
feudalization and state centralization had clearly been established Qin policies since Shang 
Yang’s time, these in themselves would not necessarily alienate anyone but the patricianate. 
Despite Mencius’s suspicions about the nouveau-powerful, the thrust of Confucian political 
ideals were towards an anti-aristocratic meritocracy anchored by a single powerful ruler, and this 
was precisely the nature of the Qin new state. Moreover, an examination of the Qin law codes 
excavated at Shuihudi indicates that neither Qin criminal nor administrative codes were as 
arbitrary as traditionally claimed or totalitarian in the manner of Han Feizi’s prescriptions. 
Indeed, the codes show close attention to issues of criminal intent, mitigating circumstances, 
procedural integrity, and investigative objectivity. The use of terror as a control device is 
specifically abjured.4  Recall too that in the text of the Xunzi, we are offered Xunzi’s supposed 
views on Qin society based on his own experience, and they are, for the most part, remarkably 
favorable, though the text ultimately critiques Qin governance as coercive.5 The “defection” to 
Legalism and to Qin of Li Si and Han Feizi, identified as students of Xunzi at Jixia, also alerts us 
to the likelihood of greater sympathy between the Confucian schools and the emerging ideas of 
                                                 
4This characterization is based on a general reading of the text through Hulsewé’s rendering. The specific code 
concerning terror to which I refer concerns coerced confession; see Hulsewé 1985: -- [library’s closed!]. 




Legalism than was traditionally acknowledged.6 
 
Evidence of Confucian collaboration 
Given the factors enumerated above, it should not seem surprising to find evidence that 
Confucians did, in fact, collaborate with the Qin government after, or even before 221. And the 
evidence is, in fact, clear that they did – most of it has always been well known and represents 
nothing new. Let’s review the most obvious features. 
One of the most famous instances of Confucian collaborationism was the response of 
Confucians to the First Emperor’s call to assist him in the fengshan sacrifices of 218. The 
emperor, having journeyed eastwards into the hotbed of Shandong Confucianism, summoned 
Confucians to consult on the rituals appropriate to these ancient and most sacred of sacrifices. 
Since these ancient sacrifices never been performed, being recent inventions, Confucians found it 
difficult to agree on the ancient precedents and, we are told, incurred in this way the fury of the 
emperor, who dismissed their various counsels and performed li of his own devising. When, at 
the key moment, a windstorm disrupted their performance, the ru showed ill-suppressed delight, 
further alienating the emperor (Shiji: 28.1366-67). What seems to me most interesting in this tale 
is simply the emperor’s interest in consulting with ru in the first place. It indicates his concern, 
well-evidenced in many respects, to adorn his reign with the trappings of legitimacy recognized 
by preceding dynasties, most immediately the Zhou, and his acknowledgment of Confucian 
teaching as the repository of knowledge concerning these rituals. We see throughout the Shiji 
                                                 
6Of course, we all know that substantial doctrinal overlap exists, but I’m speaking here of the perceived distance 
between ru teachings and the new administrative theories that men like Han Feizi seem to have been improvising on 
the basis of the works of ministers such as Li Ke and Shang Yang and theorists like Shen Dao and Shen Buhai. It is 
interesting in this regard to recall that Maoist scholarship, which celebrated the Qin and denigrated Confucians, 




account of the First Emperor’s reign an abiding concern with issues of legitimacy, exaltation of 
the imperial throne, and the borrowing of traditional marks of legitimate exaltation. The Qin 
court practiced elaborate li, and these could surely have been practiced only under the guidance 
of ru.7 
Further, reflecting on the fengshan tale, we can note that the ru responded to the 
emperor’s call, indicating either an eagerness to participate in the activities of the Qin state or, at 
least, a willingness to bow to the emperor’s implicit coercive power. The fact that the ru could be 
summoned at all indicates that their continued teaching, presumably in clusters easy to round up, 
continued to be tolerated by the state after the conquest. It is difficult to know how much to make 
of the details of the Shiji’s account, since the fengshan reports are framed as critical caricatures 
of the First Emperor and Han Wudi, and are thus more likely subject to narrative distortion than 
other sections of the text. But if the ru did, in fact, feel licensed to giggle at the emperor, literally 
or by indirection, the image of totalitarian suppression that is associated with the Qin court is less 
sustainable. 
Nor is that image sustainable later in the Qin reign. It is often overlooked that the famous 
proscription of 213 was the product of free and open speech by an apparently Confucian courtier 
in the presence of the emperor.8 When Shunyu Yue proposed the restoration of a feudal 
patricianate stemming from the royal clan, he was not only proposing a reversion from Qin to 
Zhou practices, he was making a frontal challenge to the power of the prime minister, Li Si, who 
had displaced his predecessor and gained supreme administrative power in 221 precisely by 
                                                 
7The Shiji notes that the Han founder “dispensed entirely with the burdensome ceremonial codes of the Qin” (99. 
2722), indicating the importance of li at the Qin court, though the text also explicitly notes that these were different 
from the “ancient” rites.  
8It is a weakness of the argument that follows in this paragraph that there is no indication that Shunyu Yue was a 




opposing such a policy (Shiji: 6.239). Is it imaginable that Confucians and other scholars were 
suffering unduly under the Qin if such a frontal challenge to state policy could be made in the 
emperor’s presence? And is it not extraordinary that the emperor’s initial response was merely to 
refer the proposal for consideration? It is true that ultimately Li Si prevailed and the book 
proscription was the result, but burning books is a far cry from burning scholars, and we learn of 
nothing untoward happening to Shunyu Yue himself. 
It is, however, more pertinent to our discussion here to ask what a Confucian like Shunyu 
Yue was doing at court in the first place.  
 
Confucianism and the boshi 
Shunyu Yue was a boshi, or erudite, one of seventy or so in attendance at the celebratory banquet 
of 213 that led to the book ban. The office of boshi appears to have been the chief avenue of 
Confucian collaboration during the Qin. The designation of erudite was not an innovation of the 
Qin court. There is evidence (shaky) that the designation existed nearly two centuries earlier in 
Lu, and stronger evidence that boshi was an established title in Qi at the time of Jixia (Qian 
1958: 165-66). However, the Qin court seems to have been the first to institutionalize boshi as an 
official consultative body of men selected to pursue activities connected with their specialized 
learning on behalf of the government. 
The Han shu reports that the duties of the boshi were to “comprehend (tong 通) the past 
and present.” Boshi appear to have been drawn from among many different traditions of learning 
(we see, in the Shiji, not only Confucians but fangshi types as well). We know that they were 
located at the Qin capital of Xianyang and called upon to advise the emperor in assembly from 




We also know that boshi were entrusted with special care of texts, because in the book 
proscription of 213 boshi are explicitly exempted from the ban. Boshi were also permitted to 
have followers, and, in fact, their students could number in the hundreds, just like an earlier 
generation of masters at Jixia.9 
Among the Qin boshi whom we know by name, there are two who may provide clues as 
to the role that Confucians played at court: Shusun Tong and Fu Sheng. 
Shusun Tong is famous as the ru who designed the first set of court li for the Han founder 
Liu Bang. Prior to his employment by the Han, however, Shusun Tong had served the Qin. In 
209, while an attendant at the Qin court designated for future appointment as a boshi, Shusun 
Tong was invited to participate in a consultation before the Second Emperor to advise him on the 
proper response to the rebellion that Chen She had launched in the East. Shusun Tong addressed 
the emperor in the most sycophantic terms, urging him to reject the counsel of alarmists – with 
so majestic a ruler as himself orchestrating the fine-tuned performance of the Qin bureaucracy, 
the rebellion would burn out naturally. For this, Shusun Tong was promoted to boshi rank on the 
spot. Fully aware of the disastrous implications of his own advice, Shusun Tong quickly fled 
Xianyang and joined the entourage of the rebel Xiang Liang (Shiji: 99.2720-21). 
There is much to doubt in the specific narrative of Shusun Tong at court, but if we are to 
accept any part of it as reflecting fact, what must certainly strike us as most essential to the tale is 
the fact that there were Confucian boshi at the court of the Second Emperor, four years after the 
supposedly anti-Confucian book ban and the tragic, though fictitious, burial of the Confucian 
scholars. Clearly, if any part of Shusun Tong’s tale is true, it demonstrates that Qin patronage of 
                                                 
9I am here inferring from the tale of Shusun Tong, discussed below, whose hundred plus followers at the 




Confucian erudites was strong enough to survive Li Si’s anti-scholastic policies. 
The other boshi whose story is instructive is the well known Fu Sheng, heroic preserver 
of the Shang shu. Fu Sheng was a Qin boshi who retired to the Jinan area of Shandong after the 
fall of the Qin, where he transmitted his teaching of the Shang shu. The Shiji tells us that he hid 
his text of the Shang shu at the time of the proscription of 213 and, years later, was able to 
retrieve only the 29-chapters that today comprise the “New Text” Shang shu. After Han Wendi 
succeeded to the throne in 179, that exemplary monarch, learning that a nonagenarian boshi had 
preserved the precious classic, dispatched his high minister, Chao Cuo, to receive the text from 
Fu Sheng (Shiji: 121.3124-25). Fu Sheng had somehow lost the text, but because he had been 
teaching it privately for decades he was able to recite it from memory (only the 29 chapters; he 
had apparently not memorized the text prior to hiding it). The Tang commentator Yan Shigu tells 
us that because Fu Sheng’s accent was something of a problem, his daughter had to serve as an 
interpreter (easy to believe for anyone who has heard Shandongese spoken toothlessly), but does 
not explain how Chao Cuo could have successfully transcribed the archaic diction of the text 
with only verbal cues, nor how it came to be that Fu Sheng had neither preserved the text he had 
rescued nor transcribed any new copies (Han shu: 88.3603; I do not mean to endorse Yan’s 
claim, only to share it). 
The Fu Sheng story is incoherent at many points, and we will return to one of these later, 
but here I would like to note only one aspect of Fu Sheng’s role: that he was a Qin boshi and that 
he was a Shang shu expert. Given these two facts, it is less surprising than it may otherwise have 
been to note that the Shang shu anthology actually ends not with a Zhou text per se, but rather 
with a text attributed to the first of the great monarchs of Qin, Mugong (r. 659-621). Mugong is, 




Confucian canon. Not only is the duke not usually remembered for the generosity of spirit that is 
suggested by the Shang shu chapter “Qin shi,” which supposedly records his words, in the Shi 
jing, Mugong is the target of the critical poem “Huang niao” (The oriole), which records (as does 
the Zuozhuan) the fact that the duke ordered that several of his most loyal retainers be 
slaughtered and buried with him in his grave to serve him in the afterlife. The inclusion of a 
speech attributed to such a man – the only text in the Fu Sheng collection that bears no 
connection to the houses of sages or dynastic kings – can best be accounted for by presuming 
that the chapter was added to the collection by boshi in the service of the Qin state. As such it 
would stand in itself as a record of Qin cooptation of Confucian personnel. But it can also lead us 
along another line of argument. 
 
The textual work of the Qin erudites 
The “Qin shi” is not cited in texts that we can date confidently to the pre-Qin era. Only one 
major text that could conceivably be so dated does cite it: the Daxue. The slender Daxue, of 
course, is thick with citations from the Shi and Shu, but no citation is longer than that selected 
from the “Qin shi.” The upshot of the Daxue’s commentary on the text is to say that only a man 
of ren could have composed it. How is it that the Daxue celebrates a man like Qin Mugong as 
ren? Could it be that this, too, is a record of the Qin cooptation of Confucianism? And what of 
the Daxue’s well-known companion piece, the Zhongyong? Could it be that the phrases in that 
text that state, “In the world today, carts are identical in axle width, texts are identical in script, 
and conduct is identical in roles,” were included precisely to please the authors of these policies, 
the First Emperor and his reforming minister and lapsed Confucian Li Si?10 
                                                 




This is precisely what I would like to propose. It seems to me cogent to regard both the 
Daxue and Zhongyong as products of Qin Confucianism, composed with an eye towards pleasing 
a dynasty that had become the sole source of public patronage for the Confucian community.  
As for the Shang shu, questions about its composition go well beyond the inclusion of the 
“Qin shi.” The most pressing question concerning that text is the provenance of the apparently 
genuine Western Zhou chapters, which are, with the exception of the Kang gao, entirely 
unacknowledged in the pre-Qin textual corpus, despite their overwhelming interest and 
significance. How could these remarkable texts have been in the possession of authors who, from 
the mid-fourth century at least, quoted the Shu extensively, without their ever once being 
mentioned? Clearly, it is very likely that these texts were out of circulation during the Eastern 
Zhou and were only rediscovered between that period and the time of Fu Sheng, that is, during 
the Qin. Nor is this really surprising, for if there did exist recoverable Western Zhou documents 
that had not yet come to light during the Warring States period, they would most certainly have 
been awaiting discovery amidst abandoned possessions of the Western Zhou court that fled 
Zong-Zhou in 771, shortly before the founders of the Qin state recovered the territory for the 
Zhou polity and established their own capital at Xianyang, near the site of the former Zong-
Zhou. When Confucian and other boshi were trucked west after 221, the lost Zhou shu texts 
would surely have been among the archival resources that were available to them as they pursued 
their mandate to “comprehend the past and present.”11 Fu Sheng’s Shang shu, then, is not 
                                                                                                                                                             
composition is explored by Hu Zhigui in his analysis of the origins of the text, though he ultimately dates the text to 
the post-Qin era (see Xu Weishu tongkao: II.931). 
11This argument has been undercut by the discovery of the Guodian texts (c. 300 B.C.), among which is a version of 
the Ziyi chapter now found in the Liji, which cites other “genuine” chapters of the Shang shu. Whether the point 
must be abandoned or may be modified might be determined by a lexical and syntactic analysis of chapters cited in 
Ziyi, in comparison with the remaining “genuine” chapters. I would need to undertake such an analysis were I to 




difficult to picture as an encyclopaedic anthology compiled by Confucian boshi as part of this 
mandate. 
What did this mandate actually mean? Let’s look at the three hypothetical products of the 
mandate we have already identified: the Daxue, Zhongyong, and Shang shu. What we see in the 
first two is an effort to distill and sum up the essential teachings of the Confucian school; the last 
is a compendium of the records of sages. Perhaps the sense of the mandate reported in the Shiji 
was in fact to distill and comprehensively organize the knowledge of the past so as to make it 
available to the present in government sanctioned form. 
Nor would this work have necessarily been confined to the work of Confucian erudites. 
There exist texts of questionable provenance that could easily be viewed as the encyclopaedic 
compilations of non-Confucian scholars under state sponsorship. For example, the diversity and 
multi-sectioned structure of the Zhuang zi and Han Feizi could be products of a tripartite process 
of composition, including pre-Qin sections authored by the title thinker, related materials 
compiled by Qin scholar bureaus, and creative post-Qin chapters added by independent scholars 
or former boshi into whose possession the texts had fallen. At present, however, I can offer no 
substantive analysis to support such speculation.12 
However, the most comprehensive product that suggests Qin sponsorship of 
encyclopaedic compilation is a work that has always been acknowledged to be just that: the 
                                                 
12A weakness of this line of reasoning is that once it opens the possibility of attributing anonymous compendia to 
Qin boshi, it is very hard to know where to stop. If the Daxue and Zhongyong can be seen in this light, why not the 
other chapters of the Liji, etc.? Were this view of Qin encyclopaedism to be pursued, we would need to look for 
compelling evidence pertaining for each text individually. 
Lack of evidence will not stop me, however, from speculating along another line, and suggesting that the 
one school that refused to collaborate with the Qin may have been the Mohists, perhaps permanently alienated by 
the aggressive pattern of the Qin conquest, or having permanently alienated the Qin by contributing to resistance 
with their customary zeal. (It is always tempting to search for explanations of the Mohist extinction.) It should be 
noted, however, that the Lüshi chunqiu, interpreted here as a Qin boshi product, includes a substantial Mohist 
component, though this need not necessarily have been authored by Mohists (the chapters read well, suggesting that 




Lüshi chunqiu. The received tradition concerning that text is that it was completed by the 
retainers of Lü Buwei in 239, prior to the untimely fall of their patron, and “displayed at the gate 
of the Xianyang market with a thousand gold pieces hung above it, inviting visiting scholars and 
court retainers to claim the cash simply by showing how a single word of text should be 
changed” (Shiji: 85.2510). None, of course, could do so. 
Now the tradition of the Lülan’s composition does not seem utterly improbable. The text 
uses Qin terms, such as qinshou to denote the masses, and is unquestionably the product of a 
coordinated group of multi-school authors.13 However, there are certain problems with the tale 
the Shiji tells. First, the size of the text itself makes its “display at the gate of the market” seem 
problematic – it is perhaps the single most extensive text in the pre-Han corpus; just how was it 
posted? Second, there are references in the text that would be anachronistic if the composition 
were complete in 239.14 Third, the received text has the well known anomaly of a coda chapter 
appearing after the first of its three major sections, as if the work at one time consisted entirely of 
this one part. Fourth, the twelve separate yue ling chapters appear together elsewhere as a chapter 
of the Li ji, surely a puzzling instance of borrowing. And finally, even I could have won the gold 
coins – the text is in no way as integrated as the tale suggests. 
It makes far greater sense to view the Shiji tale of the text’s compilation as indicating that 
in its original form, the text consisted precisely of the yue ling chapters, which do indeed form 
perhaps the most tightly composed and encyclopaedic text of the pre-Qin period. If one regards 
the yue ling as the outcome of a research process, rather than as the improvised traditions of a 
                                                 
13Interestingly, the term qinshou is specifically mentioned by the Shiji as a terminological innovation adopted by the 
new dynasty after the conquest (6.239). 
14I rely for this entirely on the assertion made by Naitō Torajirō, as cited in Weishu tongkao (839), to which I was 




late-arriving cosmologist-folklorist-ritualist, its composition would indeed have involved a great 
deal of time and effort by retainers inquiring into the teachings of many schools. The full text of 
the Lülan would seem to be far more ambitious than any that Lü Buwei could have seen to 
completion during the brief decade of his eminence, during which time he would have needed to 
recruit a vast array of scholars of diverse backgrounds and had them search out texts far and 
wide. While Lü’s personal resources were undoubtedly great, it seems reasonable to question 
whether they were great on such a scale. For the Lülan is indeed an encyclopaedia of pre-Qin 
teachings, and its organization, while not immediately apparent, does indeed bear traces of 
careful and even artistic categorization.15 Moreover, the formats of its various chapters show a 
high degree of standardization, and its presentation of pre-Qin viewpoints is broad and, in many 
respects, the most balanced ever gathered in one text. Clearly, the merchant Lü would have been 
an unlikely overseer of such a project; the combination of administrative and scholarly skills that 
would have been required to supervise the undertaking would have been remarkable. As the 
outcome of nouveau-riche patronage the text is astounding. However, it would be a very suitable 
and realistic product in response to an imperial mandate to “comprehend the past and present,” 
undertaken within the context of a tightly regulated scholarly bureaucracy. In short, the work fits 
the circumstances of the boshi bureau. And given the impartiality reflected in the text’s strong 
presentations of the views of all schools, it is difficult to envision any supervisory structure for 
its composition that was not bureaucratically divorced from the living disputes of pre-Qin 
philosophical thinkers. 
For if the Qin did indeed issue the boshi a mandate to “comprehend” the past, it was 
                                                 
15Chen Qiyou suggests that the organizing principle of the initial ji section coordinates the content of the essay 




surely for the purpose of sealing off the past and removing its teachings from the realm of living 
traditions to the tomb of encyclopaedic closure. Unlike the royal patrons of Jixia or the warlord 
patrons of the mid-third century, the employers of the boshi saw themselves as controlling the 
output of their scholarly retainers. These were not private teachers subsidized by lords of 
questionable legitimacy who sought the public relations benefits of seeming to lure with their 
virtue the best approximations of Bo Yi available – patrons like Wenhou of the new state of Wei 
or the usurper Tian clan in Qi. The Qin patronage of scholars was a program to gain control of 
knowledge by paying its stewards to turn their wisdom over to the state – an agenda that seems 
to reflect the approach of Li Si. That would surely explain why the book banning exempted boshi 
texts and proscribed only “private learning” (sixue). 
 
Why did Fu Sheng hide his Shang shu? 
As has been noted before, if Fu Sheng was a Qin boshi he would have had no need to hide his 
copy of the Shang shu after the 213 ban, as the Shiji account specifies. Since the terms of the ban 
are recorded in full twice in the text of the Shiji itself, presumably Sima Qian would have 
understood this, and known that his story of Fu Sheng made no sense. What can we conclude 
from the Fu Sheng story? 
It does seem incontrovertible that copies of the Shang shu were in short supply during the 
early Han. This in itself would seem odd, given the long history of the text and traditions of rote 
learning among Confucians and perhaps Mohists, unless we grant that the specific anthology we 
call the Shang shu today was, indeed, a Qin compilation incorporating many texts that were 
unfamiliar to pre-Qin ru and to Mohists. If this were the case, and if the anthologists had all been 




all, the proscription of 213 was not the only book-burning that figured in the Zhou-Qin-Han 
transition: the Qin imperial archives were torched by the troops of Xiang Yu, who was anxious 
to vent his anger at being deprived of the chance to conquer the Qin capital by force and had to 
be satisfied with the galling experience of having his triumphant campaign end with his receiving 
a second-hand bloodless surrender conveyed to him by his upstart rival Liu Bang. If boshi copies 
of texts were normally housed in the imperial archives, it would account for the loss of many 
pre-Qin texts. Fu Sheng may well have saved the Shang shu, but he would have been saving it 
from Xiang Yu’s fire, not Li Si’s. But that was no crime and would not explain why Fu Sheng 
hid the text.  
Where did Fu Sheng hide his text? It is not clear from the Shiji account whether he hid it 
near his office in Xianyang, or brought it home with him when he returned to Shandong. Which 
makes sense? The only reason for leaving it in the West would have been to avoid capture by the 
Qin authorities who might have objected to his removing the text from state auspices as he 
returned to his home in the East. But there were no Qin authorities left. Even had Fu Sheng been 
concerned about a Qin resurgence, that worry would have soon been dissipated. There was 
clearly no need to hide the text from the Qin for so long that, somehow, the copy deteriorated or 
disruptions to the hiding place dispersed portions of the text. It makes more sense to think that Fu 
Sheng took the text from the Qin capital either before its fall or soon thereafter – after all, why 
would he have wished to remain longer in the barbarous West? But if Fu Sheng brought the 
Shang shu back to Shandong after the fall of the Qin, why would he hide it at all? 
He would have hidden the text because the proscription against the Shang shu and all 
other banned texts remained in effect until 191, four years after the end of Liu Bang’s reign. And 





Liu Bang and Confucianism 
It is no secret that Liu Bang held Confucians in contempt. Despite the fact (or perhaps partially 
because) his younger brother seems to have interacted closely with Confucian scholars,16 Liu 
Bang early on established a reputation as an enemy of Confucianism. One of his earliest 
followers, the eccentric Li Yiji, was, according to the Shiji, warned about Liu Bang’s distaste for 
ru (Shiji: 97.2692) and the tale of Liu Bang publicly urinating into a scholar’s hat is well known 
(though not so well known that I can locate a text reference at the moment). Although it is 
unclear why the Han founder would have conceived so firm a dislike for Confucians prior to the 
start of his political career, there are good reasons why he would have resented Confucians later 
on. 
First, as I hope I’ve demonstrated, at least some Confucian support of the Qin Dynasty 
clearly existed, although it may not have been as profound as I suggest in this essay. Second, 
Confucians had flocked to banners other than Liu Bang’s. Initially, the scion of Confucius’s own 
clan, Kong Jia, who had presumably remained in the east filially guarding his great ancestor’s 
grave, had thrown his lot in with Chen She at the time of his initial rebellion – the Shiji tells us 
became a boshi for Chen She (which certainly suggests Chen’s own imperial ambitions; see 
Shiji: 121.3116). Judging from the Shiji account that follows, in the conflict between Xiang Yu 
and Liu Bang that ultimately led to the founding of the Han, the Confucians made a poor choice: 
After Gaohuang (Liu Bang) had killed Xiang Yu, he led his armies and lay siege to [the capital of 
                                                 
16It is curious that Liu Jiao, whom the Shiji reports to be Liu Bang’s full brother, is said by the Han shu to have 
studied Confucianism with a student of Xunzi as a youth, and to have become a patron of Confucian classicists, such 
as the Shi-master Shen Gong, whom he appointed to boshi rank after his own enfoeffment as King Yuan of Chu 
(Han shu: 36.1921-22). Liu Jiao’s branch of the clan preserved this scholarly interest, ultimately producing Liu 





the old state of] Lu. From within, the sounds of chanting and ritual music emerged, the zither-led 
songs never ceasing. Ah, was not this country where rites and music were loved the legacy of the 
sage! 
 
Yet another tight spot that Confucius had led his followers into! Indeed, the Confucians in Lu, 
which in the mid-third century had fallen under the control of Chu, had sided with Xiang Yu, a 
member of the old Chu patricianate, in the wars of succession. No wonder Liu Bang had little 
love for Confucians, who had flocked to each of his competitors for power one after the other. 
Fu Sheng’s concealment of the Shang shu was only one of many acts of concealment that 
seem to have taken place in the old homeland of Lu, where it seems that every time a bulldozer 
flattened a wall some Confucian treasure was revealed long hidden within. It seems plain that the 
true threat to the survival of the texts of the past after Xiang Yu’s devastations in the West was 
the first Han court. Only well after the death of Liu Bang, in 191, was the old Qin proscription 
finally lifted, having by then been in place for over two decades (Han shu: 2.90). 
In short, given that boshi were permitted to retain copies of all texts and that the goal of 
the Qin court in issuing the proscription on books seems to have been intended to control rather 
than destroy knowledge, we may be better advised to look to the actions of Xiang Yu and Liu 
Bang as the cause of any bibliographical gaps that characterize the post-Qin era.17 
 
The Confucian rapprochement with Han power 
It is not strictly germane to the subject at hand, but it seems fitting to note that the first 
movements of the Han court away from the strident anti-Confucianism of its earliest days were 
engineered by none other than the Qin boshi Shusun Tong. After throwing in his lot with a 
                                                 
17This would make the First Emperor compare favorably to the Qing Qianlong emperor, whose Siku quanshu, 




succession of ill-fated rebels, from Xiang Liang to King Huai of Chu to Xiang Yu, Shusun Tong 
found himself among those who surrendered to Liu Bang after the siege of Pengcheng in 205. 
Incurring the scorn of Liu Bang by appearing in ru dress, Shusun Tong exhibited the same 
resourcefulness that had earned him his doctorate in Qin and discarded his ritual outfit in favor of 
a Chu-style work uniform. His apparent willingness to turn renegade pleased the new emperor, 
who took him into his service. Ultimately, Shusun Tong was able to parlay his chameleon’s 
approach to Confucian timeliness into a lasting contribution to the school when he convinced Liu 
Bang to allow him to design new court rituals for the Han. The story of this accomplishment has 
often been told – the emperor’s despair with his raucous courtiers; Shusun Tong’s gentle offer to 
help; Liu Bang’s trepidation about his ritual incompetence; his relieved “I can manage this” upon 
seeing the new li demonstrated; the famous sigh: “Today at last I know the exaltation of being an 
emperor” after the first day of the new regime; Shusun Tong’s hapless followers at last receiving 
long-awaited appointments and cash bonuses and acclaiming their master a “true sage” after all – 
but the main importance of the story for us is Shusun Tong’s willingness to redesign 
Confucianism to appease the enemy dynasty.18 It was not until the year 200 that Shusun Tong 
was able to insinuate his ritual and his followers into the Han bureaucracy, and only from that 
point is there any opening for ordinary Confucians who lacked Shusun Tong’s unique wit, far-
sightedness, and unscrupulousness to find a place in the new age of the Han. Altogether, 
Confucian rapprochement with the Qin seems to have been a much easier process. 
 
The transformation of Confucianism 
It has often been noted that Confucianism after the Qin appears to be something very different 
                                                 




from what it was before. It is far more text based than practice based, more a matter of 
scholarship than a matter of ethical self-cultivation. This trend was, without question, one that 
had been long underway prior to the Qin era, but the process of change does seem to have been 
dramatically accelerated during the generation that experienced the Zhou-Qin-Han transition. 
Traditionally, this change has been viewed as, in part, the product of the Qin persecution. As 
should be clear by now, I don’t think there was any persecution. I believe that, in fact, the 
acceleration of the tendency towards bookishness in Confucianism was rather the product of Qin 
patronage and the particular form it took. 
The goal of the Qin in sponsoring Confucian boshi (true also of erudites appointed from 
other schools) was to transform the liberal diversity of the learning of the late Zhou from living 
traditions to museum items, useful for reference purposes in constructing a new and more perfect 
future. Schools of thought were no longer relevant; there would be only one school of thought, 
and that would be government controlled. Perhaps the ideas of the past could be of use – after all, 
“comprehending the past and the present” did imply that past and present could be linked and 
that the knowledge of the present could be informed by the past. But the Daos of the past would 
not be relevant. Indeed, the major accomplishment of the Lüshi chunqiu is precisely that it 
presents the viewpoints of the various schools not only impartially, but in standardized formats 
that inherently relativize their teachings. We can learn from all these guys, the editors seem to be 
saying, which precludes the option of becoming the disciples of any one school and the 
possibility that any of them possessed the authority of sage wisdom. 
If the speculations of this paper are on track, a generation of prominent ru were drafted 
into this approach to scholarship. The best and brightest (or, perhaps, most ambitious) devoted 




coming of the utopian Confucian future. The future had come, and it looked different. And when 
the future came to an abrupt end after 210, what this generation of Confucians was able to 
salvage from it was not the teachings they had received from their own masters and failed to 
elaborate or pass on in living form, but the texts they had devoted themselves to producing. 
These now replaced the Dao as the “jewel” Confucius had anticipated selling for a good price. 
And amidst the keen threat of Han hostility, these new classics were indeed jewels to be hidden 
in wells and walls – when the times were right and the Dao prevailed in the world again, they 
could be dug out and a new generation of Confucian teachers could make good money peddling 
them for tuition payments or royal patronage from imperial younger brothers. It would not be 
long before the students of this generation of old men, having inherited the Confucian family 
jewels, would echo the master-on-the-make, Xiahou Sheng: “If you can’t master a classic, you 
might as well go back to the farm!” (Han shu: 75.3159). 
 
The Confucian account of the Qin 
A revisionist portrait such as the one presented here inevitably raises the question of why, if the 
portrait is accurate, we have not seen it before. The thesis that Confucians were major 
collaborators with the Qin and that the Qin actively patronized Confucian scholars to the bitter 
end of the dynasty is so at odds with the traditional portrait that it would be difficult to accept 
even if the positive evidence supporting it were far more extensive than what I have presented 
here.  
To make the thesis somewhat more acceptable, we should note that it draws, among other 
things, on specific anomalies in the Shiji accounts of our two Confucian boshi and truly 




noted at the outset, what I’ve done in this paper does not go much beyond trying to catch up with 
the revisionist approach exemplified much earlier by Bodde and others when they brought into 
question the cogency of the old story of the Qin. 
That story, of course, is principally the product of Confucians, historians such as Sima 
Qian and Ban Gu, and before them men such as Jia Yi, who recast the Qin reign as a simple 
moral parable of humble virtue triumphant over aristocratic arrogance, a message that the early 
Han rulers liked to hear, and that later Confucians wanted their rulers to hear. Like Shusun Tong, 
these men were anxious to redesign the past to please a dangerous ruling house. Certainly, both 
Confucians and Han rulers would share an interest in forgetting their debt to the Qin, which had 
provided new Confucians with the support necessary to reshape their school for functionality in 
an imperial age and which had provided the Han rulers with the Legalistic state structures and 
administrative tools that they would so fruitfully exploit, albeit draped first in Huang-Lao and 
later in Confucian raiment.   
The story of the brutal Qin is a good story and undoubtedly contains much truth, but we 
have already begun to observe cracks in it, and the anti-Confucian theme that runs through it 
seems to be yet another fault line. Sima Qian was no novice when it came to writing between the 
lines – witness his faux-celebratory portrait of Liu Bang (the sage who thrice threw his children 
to the enemy to save his own skin!) – and I believe he intentionally left us some of the key clues 
that form the basis of this argument. Consider his laconic depiction of Liu Bang’s armies 
surrounding the ru in Lu noted earlier – what does this tell us about the Han threat to 
Confucianism that the Shiji never says? And consider also the incoherent tale of the boshi Fu 
Sheng hiding his Shangshu when the text was banned for all but the boshi. Was Sima Qian 




than the Qin to fear. 
Once we start unburying the scholars from the melon patch, we allow that more than one 
piece of the Confucian tale of Qin terror may be covering up rather than revealing what really 
happened. Once we admit that a story that good may be too good to be true, who knows what 
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